Tektonics Apologetics Ministries is hosting (without comment at this time) a debate between one Doug Krueger and one Maximillian Tresmond. The subject of the debate is "Does God Exist?". Mr. Tresmond is arguing in the affirmative, Mr. Krueger in the negative. Mr. Tresmond represents himself as a new convert. Mr. Krueger represents himself as "a professional philosophy instructor, with debating experience and degrees in philosophy". The "hub" page for this debate is http://www.tektonics.org/krumax.html.
Note of March 7, 2007: It has come to my attention that Mr. Krueger's essay can no longer be found on the Tektonics site. However, he used the same major arguments and much of the same text in his opening remarks for another online debate found at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/doug_krueger/krueger-mchugh. Therefore, while some of what follows does not match perfectly with this other debate, I believe it is similar enough for readers to make sense of my remarks.
Now, my answer to the question is, "Yes, of course", but I doubt that the question will truly be answered in this debate. The statements made by the parties so far support that position.
On the face of it, it would seem that the atheist has the easier job. The theist must show that all of the conditions of the given definition of theism are not demonstrably false; the atheist merely needs to show that any one of the conditions is false. All of the theist's arguments for each point must remain consistent with each other. The atheist is free to use conflicting arguments against different points. That is, an argument used to show that God is not omnipotent may contradict the argument used to show that God is not personal, but that very contradiction may demonstrate that God cannot be both omnipotent and personal. However, the apparent simplicity of the atheist's job may work against atheism in the end or, at least, against the credibility of the atheist. If the theist can successfully hold off all objections on these points, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, while both positions may appear to be reasonable, theism is the more reasonable of the two.
The theist in this debate, Mr. Tresmond, presents exactly one argument supporting the idea that God exists. He asserts that, "A recent study has shown that a belief in God is hardwired to the brain", and attempts to answer some theoretical objections to that idea. In essence, he sets forth a form of the "intelligent design" or teleological argument. Unfortunately for Mr. Tresmond, there is no study that reaches that conclusion. Some scientists claim to have measured a consistent pattern of brain activity at the times their subjects report having transcendental experiences. Such experiences, whether they take the form of "oneness with the universe" or a sense of "being in God's presence", may contribute to one's belief in God, but that is different than being "hardwired" to believe in God. While I may not agree with everything Mr. Krueger says as he responds directly to this argument, I certainly agree that Mr. Tresmond has done a poor job at the start. It is very easy to see that he is out of his depth here. That does not mean, in itself, that his conclusions are false, merely that they are unsupported by any substantial evidence or line of reasoning and, therefore, are neither credible nor persuasive. I must say I share Mr. Krueger's concern that people may be swayed to become Christians by badly-formed or badly-informed arguments.
However, I am also concerned that a new convert's faith may be shaken by such badly-formed and badly-informed arguments as Mr. Krueger provides. Some of his arguments are so specious, in fact, that even my fourteen-year-old daughter was able to instantly determine their flaws.
One may note that Mr. Krueger's other arguments all conclude that God "cannot exist" or "does not exist". Those arguments clearly relate to the question under debate. This argument, however, makes no such conclusion and does not address any part of the definitions of theism or atheism. Furthermore, what a person believes, reasonable or not, has little relevance to the actual truth.
Let us suppose that Mr. Krueger did not win the lottery, but had manufactured a facsimile of the winning ticket. He displays the ticket to a friend and shows him the actual newspaper item reporting the winning numbers. It would be extremely reasonable for his friend to believe his claim, though it is completely false. Let us further suppose that at some later time, Mr. Krueger really did win the lottery. It would be extremely reasonable for the friend to disbelieve his claims until much more evidence were provided, because Mr. Krueger's earlier deception has raised the bar of what constitutes "reasonable" evidence. We teach our children this concept with the story of "The Boy Who Cried 'Wolf'". In the end, no amount of empirical evidence will convince a person who is reasonably skeptical of that evidence.
It is easy to see, then, that at no point in time does one's belief or disbelief of a claim, however reasonable, directly relate to the truth of the claim. Mr. Krueger obviously agrees with this, since he does not consider it relevant that the vast majority of humans believe in God (or something resembling God) and find that belief to be reasonable (according to their own definition of "reasonable"). Therefore, even if one were epistemically justified in presuming theism to be false, that is a far, far cry from showing theism to be actually false, as is required in this debate.
One issue that must be addressed is the fact that Mr. Krueger provides two different definitions of the "extraordinary evidence" principle. He first states that extraordinary claims absent extraordinary evidence may be considered false (i.e. assent to the claim's falsity). Then, he says extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence to be believed (i.e. assent to the claim's truth). He states correctly that the second is "a commonly accepted principle", but it is important to note that the first is not. He fails to recognize the commonly accepted "middle ground": the suspension of judgment. Even if we did not have enough evidence to conclusively show that God exists, it would seem we have far too much evidence for his existence to satisfactorily claim that he doesn't.
Mr. Krueger also provides the definition for extraordinary claim: one that contradicts accepted physical laws or our commonsense, everyday experience. This is well and good. I certainly have no problem with his statement about eating lunch. However, while I may require a certain amount of extra evidence before I could reasonably assent to the truth of a lottery win, I would also require a certain amount of extra evidence before I would feel comfortable calling him a liar. It is our commonsense, everyday experience that people are generally honest. It is our commonsense, everyday experience that people don't purposely make false statements of this nature when the truth can be so easily determined. Therefore, the most reasonable response to the lottery claim is to suspend judgment until further evidence is obtained.
The unicorn example, as Mr. Krueger shows, is in a different category. It is only reasonable to presume the unicorn story false if we assume a certain amount of knowledge about the forest through which the claimant rode. If the story included the detail that this event occurred in some large, remote, previously unexplored area, and we have good reason to believe the speaker actually visited that area, we would be far more justified in suspending judgment pending further evidence. There is nothing in zoology or history (which only covers explored areas) that is contrary to the theoretical existence of unicorns somewhere in "terra incognita". The credibility of the claim lies entirely in whether there really is any place left on earth that has not been sufficiently explored and examined to eliminate the possibility of unicorns. Similarly, there is so much unexplored and unexplained territory in reality that it seems far more reasonable to suspend judgment on God's existence than to presume that he doesn't exist.
Mr. Krueger does not even satisfactorily show that the existence of God is an extraordinary claim. Certainly, God is a unique being and cannot truly be compared to anything else that exists. That does not, however, mean that God "contradicts accepted physical laws or our commonsense, everyday experience". There is nothing in the given definition of theism that contradicts accepted physical laws and it is our commonsense, everyday experience (and no small amount of science) that tells us that:
Thus, it can be reasonably stated that theism is not an extraordinary claim and that it is not unreasonable to assent to that claim at current levels of evidence.
Indeed, given the above considerations and the fact that the vast majority of humanity has believed in something resembling the theistic God, one might assert that it is the atheistic claim that is contrary to our commonsense, everyday experience and is in itself an extraordinary claim. Even the customary objections to these phenomena as evidence for God never go so far as to say that God doesn't exist, only that his existence is not necessary to explain the phenomena. At the very least, in light of these and other considerations, there must be room to doubt the atheistic claim and, again, to suspend judgment on the fact of God's existence.
Mr. Krueger moves on to argue that disbelief in God is somewhat justified on the grounds that even "xians are atheistic" about almost every god but one. This does seem to show an inconsistency in theistic behavior until he goes on to say that theists "disbelieve in such gods because there is absolutely no evidence that such beings exist", which is obviously false. There must be some evidence that they exist or no one would even suppose their existence. You don't give a name to something that has never been perceived through direct or indirect means. You don't offer sacrifices to that name without a real expectation (based on some real experience) of gaining some favor or avoiding disfavor. The evidence may be minimal, or ambiguous, but it is not nonexistent.
The key point, however, is that whatever level of evidence exists for these other gods is vastly inferior to the level of evidence for the theistic God. The Christian is far more justified in dismissing the Hindu's beliefs than the Hindu is justified in dismissing the Christian's beliefs, because their cases do not have equal evidential bases. We don't disbelieve in other gods just because we believe in the One God. We disbelieve in the other gods because the most trustworthy source of information available on the subject specifically says these other gods are false (which can mean they are nonexistent or demonic counterfeits). When you consider that Hindu belief probably has more going for it than a large number of other religions, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, if any god can be shown to exist, it must be the Christian God. Therefore, I am in complete agreement with Mr. Krueger's statement at the end of this section that if he can show belief in the Christian God is not justified, he is justified in disbelieving all other gods.
It is at this point that Mr. Krueger finally attempts to address the evidence for God, but first he takes a swipe at theists by stating that they don't all think that there is enough evidence to "demonstrably prove" or "demonstrate" God's existence. Please take note of the change of conditions here, and please do some research on what these theists actually say. Up to now, we've been discussing whether the level of evidence rose to that of reasonable belief. I believe that all of the named theists are in agreement that it is reasonable to believe in God. What we don't have, in their opinion (and mine), is evidence that can conclusively show all objections to be false. Since it is impossible to "prove" God to this level, some of these theists argue that the effort is misguided and there are better ways than the classical or evidentialist approach to defend the faith.
After all this, what does Mr. Krueger have to say about the actual evidence for God? Nothing, really, except that he doesn't believe it. He provides neither a description of the evidence he has examined nor any discussion as to the reasons he rejects it. He simply states that he has found it implausible. Of course, this is a debate, an adversarial forum. It is not incumbent upon either side to present both sides of the argument. The only good reason for Mr. Krueger to discuss the "pro" evidence in this exchange is if the "pro" side brings it into the discussion. Still, these statements from Mr. Krueger seem to illustrate the point that the definitions of "extraordinary", "plausible", or "reasonable" are entirely subjective. The "Presumption of Atheism", then, becomes nothing more than personal opinion with an attractive rhetorical wrapper and carries no force as a logical argument.
It is in this section that Mr. Krueger's case is most transparently weak, though I agree with the basic concept of the argument. Mr. Krueger does us the favor of stating that he is only going to address the incoherence of the "attributes ascribed to god by xianity", which is well and good, since that is the only point of interest for me in the debate. It is on this point, however, that all of his arguments fail.
The first attribute Mr. Krueger presents as incoherent is that of the Trinity. It is slightly odd that he would address this issue since it is not included in the definition of "Theism" he initially provides. Still, this is not greatly troubling since four of the sentences in his seven-sentence swipe are false, two by point of fact and two by logical consequence of the falsity of the other two. In addition, two of the remaining sentences are not actually relevant to the argument.
The claim that the "Trinity concept is that of a being who is three persons but yet one person" is simply false. Trinitarians espouse "a being who is three persons but yet one God". This concept should be no harder to master than that of a triangle: "a figure which is three line segments but yet one Polygon". This stumble in basic definitions is fatal to Mr. Krueger's argument.
It is true that "Xians often speak of god as being a 'personal god'", but using the statement here is misleading and not really relevant. Mr. Krueger's own definition shows that "personal" is a term defined somewhat by its opposition to the term, "impersonal". When we speak of a "personal God", we mean a God that relates to us personally, that is, through a personal relationship, rather than simply as if we were part of a larger body of believers. That is not intended to mean that God is a single person. Again, this should not be a hard concept to master. We often perform a mental transformation between persons and the groups to which they belong. Think of phrases like "that bank offers personal service", or "the government announced today". We know that a "bank" is composed of many persons, but when one person at the bank shows they consider our problems important, we credit the entire bank as a corporate entity. We know that it was really a person working for the government who made the announcement, but we credit the statement to the government as a corporate entity. While the analogies to the Trinity are not perfect, they clearly show the concept is not incoherent when understood properly.
While it is certainly true that one could "accuse xianity of not being monotheistic because of the trinity", it is not relevant. An accusation can be made (and has been), but once the evidence is evaluated, the accusation does not stand and Mr. Krueger's final statement on this issue is clearly shown to be false. By simple definition, if you worship three different gods who are equal, then you are a polytheist. If you worship one God in three equal persons, then you are a Trinitarian monotheist.
Mr. Krueger now moves on to various attempts to show that the attributes of God lead to logical contradiction. There are nine such arguments presented, though we are assured that many more examples could be brought to bear. That is well for Mr. Krueger, but only if these other examples are better than what he has offered here.
His first three arguments fail on the same point, a category error. God has never taken pleasure in the killing of large numbers of "civilians", but he can know exactly the pleasure felt by the terrorist who does so. God, when in full possession of his omniscience, cannot make a mistake, but he can know exactly how the human feels when that human makes a mistake. God cannot be an atheist, but he can know exactly what it's like for the human to be an atheist. In each of these cases, God knows exactly what the human knows about the human. These attributes may prevent God from knowing certain things about himself, not because his knowledge is limited, but because they are not in the category of "things that can be known", since they are things that cannot happen.
While it is clear that there is nothing we can know that God cannot know through us and about us, I must admit it is less clear whether we can perform actions he cannot. However, many of these types of objections are answered in the person of Jesus. He was, of course, capable of physical action. It is probable that he did know how to swim, given the amount of time he spent near the sea and in boats. It is a matter of theological debate whether he fully possessed God's omniscience at all times, but it is certain he did not always display it. The Bible says he "grew in wisdom" (Luke 2:52), and it would seem he would have needed to learn how to walk and talk as a normal child. However, it is impossible to tell whether this was actual learning or God emulating normal human behavior. There is also much debate about whether Jesus was capable of sinning (but never did), or whether sin was impossible for him.
The above considerations are of little importance to the debate, however, because the definition of "omnipotence", as commonly used by theists, is not parallel to the definition of "omniscience". To be all-knowing is to know all things that can be known, but to be all-powerful is not to be able to do all things that can be done. It is to have power and authority over all things. God is capable of controlling every aspect of existence. He can create, un-create, and re-create the universe or anything in it as he pleases. The question of his swimming ability is trivial compared to the idea that he created all swimmers or can stop all swimming or even remove swimming from the history of the cosmos. This definition of omnipotence (the one theists really use) does not lead to contradiction. Mr. Krueger's arguments merely show that his definition of omnipotence is incoherent.
The same can be said of his definition of "transcendent". Webster's II and American Heritage dictionaries agree that, when applied to "the Deity", it means "above and independent of the material universe." The Oxford English Dictionary states that a transcendent being is "not subject to the limitations of the material universe". That is quite different than a simplistic statement of being "outside space and time" as Mr. Krueger attempts to use the term in his arguments. God's transcendence does not contradict his other attributes. Indeed, it is a prerequisite for them! It is the very fact that God is not limited by the normal considerations of locality in space-time that we can consider him to be present in all places at all times. It is his transcendent nature that allows God to operate on any scale in any and every locality at the "same time" (as humans reckon time). The ability to know all things is predicated on the ability to perceive and comprehend all things happening everywhere and every when. Far from being in opposition to each other, the four attributes of transcendence, omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence cannot logically be separated from one another when properly defined and understood.
The final argument of this section concerns God's justice and his mercy. Both of his definitions can be reasonably construed as true and relevant to Christianity but the conclusion is false. Part of the definition of contradiction is that the allegedly contradictory properties be in effect at the same time. There is no contradiction in saying "My car is red" and "My car is not red" if it is understood that these statements were uttered at different times in my car's existence. God's mercy is available and expressed during a certain portion of a person's existence, before physical death. Anyone who recognizes and repents of their sin, understands their need for a savior, and accepts Jesus as that savior will receive God's infinite mercy. All of their sins (past, present, and future) are punished in the person of Christ. God's perfect justice, on the other hand, is expressed at the time after bodily death. God gives people exactly the punishment they deserve at that time. If their sins have already been punished through the shedding of Jesus' blood, then the fate they deserve is eternal companionship with God. If their sins have not already been punished, then the fate they deserve is eternal separation from God. God's mercy and justice are both perfect and only seem to contradict when one fails to consider that they are not applied simultaneously.
In summary, then, we may say that all of Mr. Krueger's arguments are valid as he defines and understands the terms. However, he has also stated that would only discuss the attributes as they are "ascribed to god by xianity", which he has not done. His definitions of the Trinity and omnipotence do not agree with prevalent Christian thought. His usage of transcendence differs from that given in commonly available dictionaries. His understanding of God's justice and mercy appears to be incomplete. While none of this actually demonstrates that theism is true or that atheism is false, one must admit these considerations are very damaging to Mr. Krueger's case.
While this is simply a special case of the "Incoherent Attributes" argument (omnipotence vs. omnibenevolence), it is a much stronger argument than those previously presented. However, that is more due to emotional, subjective elements than to logical reasoning. Applying the precepts of philosophical debate to very real suffering and pain is often seen as inconsiderate, or even cruel, especially if one is arguing, as the theist must, that the suffering is justified and necessary. On the other hand, our hearts also rebel at the thought that this suffering is completely meaningless, as the atheist must argue.
The basic flaw of Mr. Krueger's argument here is that Premise #2, that "there is needless suffering in this world", is completely false in terms of Christian belief. He complicates the issue by blurring the distinction between "needless" suffering and unexplained suffering.
I do not deny that much suffering appears to be unnecessary. When faced with the reality of events such as 9/11 and the Holocaust, it is completely understandable and appropriate to want to know exactly why such things happen, and how God (if we believe in God) could allow them to happen. That is why Rabbi Kushner and others have to write books.
Still, when attempting to ascertain the "need" or the meaning of these events, we should not make the mistake (as Mr. Krueger does) of forgetting that these large-scale tragedies are really made up of hundreds, thousands, or millions of individual tragedies, potentially leading to a multiplicity of "goods". While we may be able to say that some specific greater good could have been accomplished with fewer deaths, we cannot conclude that those "extra" deaths are truly "superfluous".
As Mr. Krueger states, there are plenty of books on the subject from a number of perspectives. I do not intend to present an exhaustive defense of the classical problem of evil, but here is a simplified list of possible goods that may come from suffering:
Often, in the end, even when shown that the existence of evil does not preclude the existence of God, people remain doubtful. This is perfectly normal, and perhaps the best outcome a theist should hope for. The problem of pain should disturb us. It should cause us to doubt that things are as they supposed to be. It should just rip up our guts, to be blunt, that the world is like this. But, that is precisely the point theists have been making for thousands of years. That we can even tell the difference between what the world is and what it should be is evidence for the existence of God as the absolute moral arbiter and our position as moral agents.
This is also simply a special case of the "Incoherent Attributes" argument, again attempting to show a conflict between God's omnipotence and his omnibenevolence. While not explicitly stating that this argument will be considered in Christian terms, the references to "salvation" and "Jesus" in the lists of propositions could reasonably lead one to believe that is the case. Again, though, the case presented fails on that very point.
Premise #1 in Mr. Krueger's simplified argument from nonbelief is not representative of Christian thought. While most Christians would agree that God "wants each person to be saved", it has never been the position of the traditional Christian church that "having certain beliefs" is "sufficient for salvation". I don't know how both Mr. Krueger and the authority he cites, Theodore Drange, could have missed this crucial point. Mere intellectual assent to the truths espoused by Christianity saves no one. The Bible touches on the subject in this way:
You believe that there is one God. Good! Even the demons believe that -- and shudder. James 2:19 (NIV)
There is no one more orthodox in their beliefs, in what they know to be true, than Satan and his angels, but they are not "saved". Premise #2, contrary to Mr. Krueger's assertion, is problematic, then, because of the failure of Premise #1, and much of the following discussion becomes irrelevant. With that in mind, I still wish to address some of the issues raised here.
The issue of free will in salvation theology is not that of the choice to believe or disbelieve in God's existence, as Mr. Krueger occasionally seems to contend. Faith is not just simple belief. It is the choice to be loyal to a belief even when it would be easier not to. Believing in George W. Bush's existence doesn't make you an American. Believing in God's existence doesn't get you into the kingdom of God. Certainly, belief must come before salvation, but belief alone, in the absence of any other action or commitment, does not constitute "saving faith".
I'm certain that everyone reading this understands that employers are hardly satisfied with mere recognition of the employer's existence and an intellectual understanding of the goals and practices of the business. They expect employees to recognize the employer's authority over them, to perform tasks consistent with the company's goals, and to refrain from activities which would undermine those goals. Failure in any of these areas is grounds for discipline or dismissal, regardless of what one may believe. Similarly, God only saves those who have placed their lives in his hands, who are sincerely desirous of acknowledging him as their leader, and who are committed to obeying "management directives".
It is those who refuse to make this kind of commitment that can be described as "hard-hearted" or "stiff-necked". I know many people who say they are Christians, or have no trouble believing in the theistic God, but who would never give him control over their lives and would resent any suggestion that they should. In short, it doesn't matter what you may believe about the Giver, or the Gift, if you never freely choose to accept that Gift.
Mr. Krueger also completely fails to consider that there may be some virtue, some positive value, in making this choice in the absence of irrefutable evidence. It may be a requirement of the divine economy that people do not simply acquiesce to an inevitable conclusion, but that they take the proverbial "leap of faith". While we have room to doubt God's existence, knowledge, and goodness, we have so much more room to doubt our own doubts and questions in the face of our demonstrable ignorance and propensity to selfishness.
In regard to the following comment:
Claims that people "deep down" all know that god exists are just pleasant falsehoods that theists often tell themselves to avoid facing the fact that many intelligent, conscientious people throughout history have diligently examined the alleged evidence for the existence of god and have found it to be clearly insufficient.
one can easily make the counter-claim that this statement is simply a "pleasant falsehood" that atheists tell themselves to avoid facing the fact that many more intelligent, conscientious people throughout history have diligently examined the alleged evidence for the existence of God and have found it to be clearly sufficient. In fact, theists usually only make these claims when accompanied by arguments that everyone has access to that sufficient evidence.
Yet again, we seem to be left with personal opinion about what is "sufficient", "extraordinary", and "reasonable". The biblical authors presented what they felt was extraordinary evidence, placing God firmly in the pages of history. For several thousand years, that was deemed sufficient. Only our "modern" ways of thought have diminished those claims, but even those are making way for "postmodern" and "ultramodern" modes that refuse to acknowledge any evidence as extraordinary or conclusive and do not even give much credence to the principle of contradiction that is the foundation of many of Mr. Krueger's arguments. We're moving toward a future populated by those able to believe that both theism and atheism may be considered true, and a time when debates like this are considered meaningless.
At first, I did not intend to spend much time on Mr. Krueger's response to Mr. Tresmond's argument. As previously stated, I am in basic agreement that the single point of evidence introduced by Mr. Tresmond is fairly insubstantial. But, as I was re-reading Mr. Krueger's argument, it seemed to me that he had made a startling admission. To quote:
People must be taught to believe in god. Children are not born with a belief in god. A child brought up without ever hearing mention of a god will not have such a belief. If it must be taught, it is not innate.
The first sentence there actually says it all. If people must be taught to believe in God, then who taught the first people to believe in God? The only logical candidate is God Himself. Mr. Krueger has not only argued that God exists, but that God has revealed enough of himself to a large enough group of people to start and keep the whole theistic ball rolling.
Mr. Krueger must have had some inkling of that as he was writing, because he decided to cover the other side of the fence and give a naturalistic explanation of an innate belief in a non-existent God. However, the following statements still seem to leave him in an awkward position:
In fact, the concept of god has probably led more people to wipe out competing societies than any other known concept. The survival value is clear, especially upon a reading of the Old Testament. Competitors were routinely "destroyed utterly".
Given that he uses the word "probably" in the first sentence, it is "probable" that he doesn't have any actual facts at hand to back up that assertion. Still, if belief in God is somewhat innate and its "survival value is clear", then where does that leave atheists? Do they have an evolutionary disadvantage? Are they Darwinian traitors, promoting a view that reduces their society's ability to compete? Is Mr. Krueger coming dangerously close to saying that we should "wipe out" the atheists for the betterment of humanity?
Though it's a bit of a digression, I feel I must respond to his misrepresentation here of the Old Testament. He can't be referring to the large-scale killings ascribed directly to God, because that would be admitting that God actually exists, so he must simply be talking about the conquest of the Promised Land. However, the fact of the matter is that very little was "utterly" destroyed by the Israelites. They did not succeed in ending the worship of any other gods and even promoted them during some periods. They were not able to completely displace the previous tenants of the land, let alone able to "wipe out" any "competing societies". Certainly, whatever destruction occurred cannot be described as "routine", since most of the original conquest was finished within a single generation.
To summarize my response to Mr. Krueger's opening statement:
By now, it is easy to see that the majority of concepts against which Mr. Krueger argues are of his own construction, not Christianity's. It is my hope that the new Christians at whom he is aiming will not be scared off by "straw men" such as these. It is my further hope that Mr. Krueger will re-evaluate his arguments and stop making some of these claims.